Opinion Poll, March 2005

Contents :

  1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
  2. COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
  3. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF REPORT

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In May 1998 an Inter-party Political Agreement was endorsed by Referendum: 71% voted in favour of the Agreement and 29% voted against. Subsequently, an election was held to return 108 members to the new Assembly, which in turn internally elected the Executive, comprising 12 members, headed, as at October 2002, by David Trimble (First Minister), and Mark Durkan (Deputy First Minister).

In October 2002, it was alleged that Sinn Fein had been carrying out political spying, an act regarded as a clear breach of the Agreement. The Northern Ireland Assembly was thereafter suspended by the Secretary of State. (There had also been a previous suspension in February 2000.) On suspension, the government of Northern Ireland reverted to "Direct Rule", by a ministerial team appointed by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Further informal talks ensued, and in October 2003, it was announced that an Assembly election would be held on November 26th. (Postponed from its scheduled date of May 2003). On the day of the announcement (October 22nd) a series of statements was made, firstly by Gerry Adams, leader of Sinn Fein, and then by de Chastelain, who verified that a further (third) act of decommissioning had occurred, but that he remained bound by the IRA injunction not to provide quantitative or other details. Very shortly thereafter, David Trimble made a statement in which he asserted that the non-provision of such details was unsatisfactory, and that he would therefore "put the process on hold", by not committing to reforming the administration, i.e., the Executive government. Nevertheless, the decision to hold the election was maintained.

The election results revealed considerable polarization towards the ‘hard-line’ parties on either side, with the SDLP for the first time being eclipsed by Sinn Fein, whilst on the unionist side, Ian Paisley’s DUP came in ahead of David Trimble’s UUP. This meant that in the event of the Assembly being restored and a new Executive formed, that the DUP would provide the First Minister and Sinn Fein the Deputy First Minister.

Nevertheless, the Assembly remained in suspension and informal talks ensued with a view to reconciling the positions of Sinn Fein and the DUP. Whilst these talks, which focused on the issue of IRA decommissioning, appeared promising, they foundered on the means of verification: the DUP required photographic evidence, a process rejected by the IRA.

Direct rule continued indefinitely, but a number of events sharply focused attention on the intentions and activities of the IRA and the relationship of Sinn Fein and its leaders with that organization. Specifically a well-orchestrated robbery involving intimidation of staff and their families relieved the Northern Bank of £26.5m. The Chief Constable of the PSNI, Hugh Orde, shortly made a statement declaring his belief, on the basis of investigations and intelligence, that the robbery hade been carried out by the IRA. This position was shortly affirmed by both the British and Irish governments, and by the fourth report of the Independent Monitoring Commission. The IMC also stated that Sinn Fein must bear a share of responsibility for the abductions and robberies, and that some of its senior members were members of the IRA and involved in sanctioning the series of robberies.

In January 2005, the murder in Belfast occurred of Robert McCartney, known to have strong Republican sentiments. His sisters shortly made a series of statements to the effect that IRA members had been involved in this murder and that the IRA and Sinn Fein were inadequately facilitating the identification, charging, and prosecution of the perpetrators. Amongst other responses to this initiative, the IRA firstly reported dismissing some members, and then projected an offer to shoot them.

Against this background, Millward Brown Ulster carried out a wide-ranging opinion poll to ascertain the state of public opinion in Northern Ireland, focusing on attitudes to the activities and intentions of the IRA, and what might be required to encourage support for the restitution of the Assembly on an inclusive basis. A representative sample of 1010 adults (18+) was interviewed from 7th to 8th March 2005 by fully trained and experienced interviewers, according to the definitive quality standards of the IQCS (Interviewer Quality Control Scheme). All interviewing was carried out face-to-face at 56 sampling points selected at random throughout Northern Ireland.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

At the time of the Agreement Referendum in May 1998, a weakness emerged in that the Agreement failed to achieve proportionate cross-community support: whereas Catholics were virtually universally in favour, only 51% of Protestants were in favour and 49% were opposed. It was also clear that this opposition was overwhelmingly predicated on anxiety about the intentions of Republican paramilitaries with regard to violence. To gauge these perceptions, respondents were invited to indicate whether they thought that it was the IRA’s intention to disarm under the arrangements of the Agreement; only to do so when there was a united Ireland; or never. Amongst neither Catholics nor Protestants was there a majority view that the IRA intended to disarm under the Agreement, and it was very clear that Protestant anxieties remain particularly widespread and profound: 66% thought that they would never disarm, and 22% that they would do so only when their goal of a united Ireland had been achieved. Only 9% felt that they would honour the undertaking to disarm under the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement.

The perceived performance of the 4 main party leaders amongst their own supporters revealed that Gerry Adams continues to enjoy easily the strongest esteem notwithstanding the controversy over IRA criminality and the status of Sinn Fein in this regard. However, compared to November 2003, a small decline in his standing appeared to have occurred. In contrast however, the standing of Mark Durkan (SDLP) fell noticeably, as did that of David Trimble. Regard for Ian Paisley amongst DUP supporters was the only one to have moved in a positive direction. In tandem with this finding, preference for David Trimble as First Minister fell sharply since 2003, with Ian Paisley on the ascendant. Mark Durkan marginally improved his support as First Minister relative to Gerry Adams.

A key parameter of the election (widely conjectured to be held on 5th May) will be the turnout. However, 57% said that they would be certain to vote, and 16% that they would be very likely to do so. On this evidence, it appears likely that the turnout will be along similar lines as in recent elections.

An assessment of voting intentions pointed to an extremely close position between Sinn Fein and SDLP. Whilst interim opinion polls (unlike exit polls) are not specifically intended to afford predictions of forthcoming elections, this finding suggests a moderate adjustment of the SDLP / Sinn Fein share of vote, but by no means points to any landslide dilution of the Sinn Fein vote as result of the recent controversies. However, on the unionist side, the findings point to a further heavy shift in favour of the DUP (Ian Paisley) at the expense of the UUP (David Trimble). When evidence of any overt shifting in party support on behalf of those who voted in the November 2003 Assembly Election was examined, it was found that SDLP and Sinn Fein gains and losses largely balanced out: however, the scale of the respective gains and losses suggests that there may be considerable mobility between these parties. Shifts in favour of the DUP were much higher than for the UUP.

For Nationalists, a crucial component of the Agreement was police reform. Previously, the RUC had been regarded by Nationalists as sectarian and repressive, and major provisions of the Agreement (via the Patten Commission) were the renaming of the RUC to PSNI (Police Service of Northern Ireland); new regulations specifying that recruitment should be 50% Catholic and 50% non-Catholic; and the establishment of the Policing Board and Police Ombudsman. Confidence in the PSNI continues to be stronger among Protestants than Catholics, but on both sides, there was marginal improvement in confidence since 2003.

On both sides, there was considerable unease with the Ombudsman and the Policing Board, and no indication of any improvement over the past year. Even more marked was the decline in confidence in the International Commission on Decommissioning, headed by John de Chastelain. In some contrast, confidence in the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) marginally improved in tandem with an uplift in those appearing to be aware of this body.

General confidence in the future prospects for long and lasting peace was also monitored, and indicated a moderate downswing in Catholic confidence since 2003, and no shift as far as Protestants are concerned. Catholic confidence was greatly boosted by the Agreement, and remains significantly stronger than Protestant confidence.

In view of the current suspension of the Assembly, and the factors contributing to the suspension, the poll gauged support for restoring that institution, with the full participation of all parties. As things stood at the time of the poll, only 29% would advocate the Secretary of State proceeding along these lines, but rose to 47% of Catholics compared to only 13% of Protestants, who were much more likely to advocate restoring the Assembly with the exclusion of Sinn Fein (43%). However, in the event of the IRA verifiably decommissioning all weapons, Protestant support for an inclusive Assembly increased to 33%, and increased even further to 45% if the IRA were to disband and verifiably disarm. (In the event of IRA disbanding, Protestant support for Sinn Fein inclusion outweighs support for their exclusion, but decommissioning alone is not sufficient for this balance of opinion to occur).

When nationalist voters were asked to state what they felt the IRA should now do, a majority of 70% thought that they should decommission all weapons, and a majority of 60% thought that they should disband. Specifically amongst Sinn Fein voters, 59% advocated full decommissioning, and 44% disbandment. Thus, whilst this poll reveals substantial support for Gerry Adams amongst Sinn Fein voters, and no more than moderate retrenchment of the Sinn Fein share of vote, there appears to be a substantial body of opinion amongst supporters that the IRA may no longer be of relevance and should as a minimum dispose of the means of violence or even disband.

Overall, a majority of 61% agreed that the IRA was responsible for the £26.5m Northern Bank robbery, a level very similar to an earlier poll in the Republic of Ireland. However, whilst Protestants were almost universal in this belief, Catholics were relatively divided, and uncertain.

In response to the IMC and the Irish Governments statements that Sinn Fein shared responsibility for the Northern Bank robbery and that senior Sinn Fein members may have had prior knowledge, Gerry Adams issued a verbal challenge that evidence be produced or that he be arrested and charged. Overall, the poll indicated that the Northern Ireland populace is divided as to whether such an arrest would be the right course of action (47%), or the wrong one (32%). Whilst unionist parties were generally inclined to the view that such a measure would be appropriate, nationalists took the reverse view, although 13% of Sinn Fein voters were inclined to the view that Gerry Adam’s challenge to be arrested should be taken up.

47% were dissatisfied with the response of the Sinn Fein leadership to the killing of Robert McCartney, outweighing the 29% who were satisfied. Amongst Sinn Fein voters specifically, whilst a majority of 65% were satisfied, a significant minority of 25% were not.

When those dissatisfied with the response were invited to say why this was so, the primary reasons were that the Sinn Fein leadership had dissimulated; that they should identify the perpetrators or provide any other relevant information; that they had not done sufficient to bring the killers to justice; and that they were now reacting belatedly to the initiative of McCartney’s sisters.

Overall, 70% considered that Sinn Fein’s cooperation with the PSNI was inadequate, including 25% of Sinn Fein supporters, and 59% of SDLP supporters.

Lastly, when respondents were invited to state what if anything, they thought Sinn Fein needed to do to demonstrate commitment to democracy and peace, the main declarations were that they should: