Belfast Telegraph Election Poll (16th May 2001)

Contents :

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In May 1998 an inter-party political Agreement was endorsed by Referendum: 71% voted in favour of the Agreement, and 29% voted against. Subsequently, an election was held to return 108 members to the new Assembly, which in turn internally elected the Executive, comprising 12 members, headed by David Trimble (First Minister), and Seamus Mallon (Deputy First Minister). However, one of the provisions of the Agreement related to IRA decommissioning, and as no decommissioning had occurred by February 2000, the Executive and Assembly were suspended by Peter Mandelson, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Further negotiations ensued, as a result of which the Assembly and Executive were re-instated on the grounds that IRA "arms dumps" would be inspected by the decommissioning body led by General de Chastelain. This arrangement was accepted at a special meeting of David Trimble's Ulster Unionist Party on their understanding that this would be an interim measure and that June 2001 would apply as the date for full implementation of the Agreement, including decommissioning. Early in May 2001, David Trimble issued a letter of resignation as First Minister, post-dated to June 1st, unless IRA decommissioning had occurred by then. As a core principle of the Agreement is inclusivity (i.e., that all the signatory parties must both participate and honour their stated commitments), a UUP ejection of David Trimble as leader could well terminate the Executive, Assembly and Agreement. During the period from the Agreement to the present, there has been continuing violence in the form of localized intimidation and beatings, atrocities by the Real IRA, and an out-break of violence between rival Loyalist paramilitary groups. Other controversial issues have been the Patten recommendations on the future of policing in Northern Ireland, the widespread releases of paramilitary convicts, and the resignation of Peter Mandelson as Secretary of State. (He was replaced in January 2001 by John Reid.)

The next UK General Election has been set for June 7th 2001: the postponement of this election by 1 month because of the Foot and Mouth crisis, means that it will coincide with a separate election for local councils in Northern Ireland.

Against this background, Ulster Marketing Surveys carried out a wide-ranging opinion poll to ascertain the state of public opinion in Northern Ireland, focusing on support for the Agreement, the Executive, Decommissioning, and Policing. A representative sample of 1,031 adults (18+) was interviewed from 10th to 15th May 2001, by fully trained and experienced interviewers, according to the definitive quality standards of the IQCS (Interviewer Quality Control Scheme). All interviewing was carried out face-to-face at 56 sampling points selected at random throughout Northern Ireland.

For the purposes of examining trends over time, the results of this poll have been compared to other major exit and opinion polls carried out by Ulster Marketing Surveys in May 1998, June 1998, and October 2000.

COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS

Ministers of the Northern Ireland Executive are drawn from the four large political parties, and an assessment of the performance of the corresponding leaders of these parties (since the Assembly Elections in June 1998), revealed that John Hume emerged with the strongest reputation, rated as "very good" or "fairly good" by 58% of the total electorate. Not far behind was David Trimble with a 53% very / fairly good rating. Appreciably weaker rating was achieved by Gerry Adams, whose 38% very / fairly good, was almost counter-balanced by a 33% fairly / very poor response. The least favourable rating emerged for Ian Paisley, whose 32% very / fairly good was out-weighed by a 36% very / fairly poor. Unsurprisingly, the ratings for each of these leaders was appreciably better amongst those who would vote for their respective parties, and again it was John Hume's endorsement (90% very / fairly good) which was by far the strongest, although Gerry Adams was not far behind with a similar rating of 79%. In contrast however, both Ian Paisley's and David Trimble's ratings amongst DUP and UUP supporters respectively, were appreciably weaker.

These performance ratings were further extended to the 10 Ministers leading each of the Executive departments from which Brid Rodgers emerged with easily the most positive response: 69% of the electorate conferred a very / fairly good rating, the next best being Reg Empey, with a 54% very / fairly good rating.

As First Minister, David Trimble has exercised his authority to exclude Sinn Fein ministers from attending North / South Ministerial Council meetings until such time as the IRA has initiated decommissioning. Overall, 51% of the electorate thought that this ban was justified, compared to 36% who thought it was unjustified (the balance had no view one way or the other). However, there was almost complete polarization on this view according to party support, with UUP and DUP supporters almost totally of the view that the ban was justified, whereas Sinn Fein supporters almost universally consider the ban to be unjustified. Accordingly, the response of SDLP voters is of interest, and it was observed that this group were less unanimous in their views on this issue, but nevertheless largely side with their Sinn Fein counterparts: 72% of SDLP voters think the ban is unjustified, compared to 18% who support the ban.

The Agreement was signed on Good Friday in April 1998, since when many of the key institutions arising from the Agreement, have been put in place. However, much controversy remains over whether the terms of the Agreement have been properly met, particularly with regard to issues such as decommissioning and police reform. Accordingly, all respondents were invited to indicate whether they felt, at this juncture, that the party they supported should now withdraw from the Agreement. For all of the major signatories however, it was very clear that their supporters would not at this stage wish them to withdraw. In view of UUP stated anxieties over decommissioning, the response of UUP voters is of particular significance: 66% believe that the UUP should not withdraw from the Agreement compared to only 15% who believe that it should.

The central institution arising from the Agreement is the Northern Ireland Assembly, to which 108 members were elected in June 1998. That this institution has been favourably received was very evident from the very strong support expressed for its establishment: 75% are in favour, compared to only 12% opposed. The only party whose members differed significantly from this pattern were those of the DUP whose supporters are very divided on this issue: 45% were in favour of the Assembly compared to 40% who are opposed.

Further insight on public evaluation of the Assembly was obtained by inviting respondents to rate its contribution to the well being of the people of Northern Ireland using a five-point scale from "very good" to "very poor". Although only 16% overall were directly critical, it was clear that many electors are still quite uncertain about this issue: 41% thought that the Assembly has been "fairly good", and 30% have not formulated any particular opinion one way or the other. Catholics however, emerged with a much more positive view of the Assembly's contribution than Protestants, amongst whom it is still very clear that the "jury is out" on the Assembly's impact.

If the Secretary of State takes the view that there has been a breach of the Agreement on behalf of one or more of the signatories, he can suspend the Assembly, re-establishing "direct rule" via a ministerial team appointed by Downing Street. The overwhelming opinion of the electorate as a whole however, was that there are currently insufficient grounds for any such suspension, 78% saying that this should not happen, compared to only 17% who thought that it should. The only major political party whose supporters showed a reversal of this outlook were those of the DUP although even here, DUP supporters were divided: 50% thought that the Assembly should be suspended, and 43% did not.

On decommissioning, the Agreement states "all participants reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations and that they will use any influence they have to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within 2 years". In the 3 years since the signing of the Agreement, an insignificant amount of decommissioning has occurred (and none from the Provisional IRA), and accordingly respondents were asked whether the paramilitary organisations should now proceed with decommissioning. Overall, an overwhelming majority of over 80% expressed the view that both IRA and Loyalists paramilitaries should decommission all of their weapons. A further 12% thought that they should decommission some weapons, which means that effectively 94% of the Northern Ireland electorate believe that decommissioning should be initiated on both sides. Further analysis of this finding demonstrates that 85% of Catholics think that the Provisional IRA should now proceed with decommissioning, and 97% of Protestants think that Loyalist paramilitaries should now proceed with decommissioning. Furthermore, amongst Sinn Fein supporters, 72% think that the Provisional IRA should proceed with decommissioning, and amongst PUP / UDP supporters, 85% think that Loyalist paramilitaries should proceed with decommissioning.

A further section of the Agreement deals with security issues including (consistent with the level of threat), the removal of security installations. Responsibility for security in Northern Ireland remains with the UK Government, and the issue of how the Government should proceed with security installations received a very divided response. Narrowly, the most popular option is that the Government should dismantle more army or security bases only when there has been IRA decommissioning, stated by 42%. This view was more definitively the view of Protestants, cited by 53%, although majority Catholic opinion (61%) was that further dismantling of security bases should continue even in the absence of decommissioning.

In the forthcoming general election and local council elections this year, an issue that may be of considerable impact is the possibility of pacts between some of the parties. To determine the desire or otherwise of supporters of those parties to form such pacts, SDLP and Sinn Fein voters were asked if these 2 parties should form a pact and DUP / UUP supporters were similarly asked if these 2 unionist parties should form a pact.

In both instances, it was observed that supporters were divided in almost equal proportions: however, for SDLP / Sinn Fein the balance of overall opinion (45% to 38%) was against an electoral pact, whereas for the unionist parties, the situation was reversed in favour of forming a pact (45% to 39%). On the SDLP / Sinn Fein side, strongest support for the pact concept came from Sinn Fein (49% in favour), whilst on the unionist side, strongest support for the pact came from UUP voters (48% in favour). On this evidence it appears that parties need to seriously consider these possibilities, and to articulate their decisions carefully to their voters, one way or the other.

One of the provisions of the Agreement of most importance to the nationalist parties related to reform of the police, and the recommendations for this reform were made by the Patten Commission. Amongst the wide ranging recommendations that were made was renaming of the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the establishment of recruitment procedures that would ensure that recruitment was 50% Catholic. These recommendations and their implementation have been hugely controversial, and the Poll tested the respective acceptability of Protestants and Catholics applying to join the new Police Service of Northern Ireland, which has already issued widespread recruitment advertising. (The order of asking was randomized in respect of Catholics and Protestants.) For both religious backgrounds, a large majority considered it acceptable to join: 82% found it very or fairly acceptable for Catholics to join and 87% found it very or fairly acceptable for Protestants to join. In view of the under-representation of Catholics in the RUC, it is of great significance that 70% of Catholics now consider it acceptable for Catholics to join the new Police Service, compared to 17% considering this to be unacceptable.

Attitudes towards the actual name change from the RUC to the Police Service of Northern Ireland revealed strong polarization between Protestants and Catholics. Amongst the former, 55% are implacably opposed to this change (a further 25% were prepared to tolerate it, and only 19% were actually in favour of it). Amongst Catholics, an overwhelming majority (85%) was unequivocally in favour of this change.

With regard to flying the Union flag on certain designated days from police stations, Catholic opposition to this concept seemed less definitive: 46% were implacably opposed, but 26% indicated they would be prepared to tolerate it, and 26% were actually in favour. (Protestants, at 90%, were heavily in favour of this proposition.)

A central ingredient in the Patten Commission recommendations is that recruitment should be 50% Catholic. (Notionally, the remainder should be 50% Protestant, although both the Commission and the Northern Ireland Office make it clear that non-Christians and those of indeterminate religious background would contribute to the 50% "non-Catholic" recruitment, so as not to dilute the "50% Catholic" criterion.) Attitudes towards these recruitment provisions revealed a rare case of Catholic / Protestant consensus: in both cases a majority unequivocally stated that they were in favour (64% Protestant and 83% Catholics). Definitive opposition to this recruitment criterion came from 18% of Protestants and 7% of Catholics.

The Agreement came into being in May 1998, when it was endorsed by Referendum. However, there appeared to be some lack of conviction amongst the electorate as a whole that the Agreement is improving conditions in Northern Ireland: although 57% agreed with this proposition, 44% of these were equivocal in their response ("tend to agree"), whilst a further 24% had no clear opinion one way or the other, and 19% actually disagreed. Furthermore, there is evidence of a clear difference in opinion according to religious background: Catholics evinced a much more positive opinion of the impact of the Agreement, whereas Protestants emerged as very uncertain.

In the event of the Agreement breaking (or even the Assembly being suspended by the Secretary of State), Government in Northern Ireland would resume to "direct rule" from Westminster, that is to say via a ministerial team appointed by Downing Street and operating under the overall authority of the Secretary of State as a Cabinet Member. However, despite many of the controversial issues relating to the Agreement, and the institutions evolving from it, the electoral evinced little enthusiasm for a return to "direct rule", and whereas Catholics expressed particularly strong dissent with this notion, it was also observed that 49% of Protestants disagreed that it would be better to return to direct rule, compared to 25% who agreed with this proposition.

In view of all that has taken place, a key factor in determining public support for the implementation of the Agreement is confidence in the prospects for normal conditions and peace. However, since the advent of the Agreement in May 1998, there are clear signs of erosion of public confidence in the prospects for long and lasting peace: in fact the balance of opinion has slipped from 55% indicating that they were "very / fairly confident" in May 1998, to 65% indicating that they are "not at all / not very confident" by May 2001. Consistently, Catholics have always evinced a much higher degree of confidence in the long-term impact of the Agreement than Protestants, amongst whom only 19% now say that they are very or fairly confident. However, this decline in confidence is also evident amongst Catholics: in May 1998, 82% said that they were very / fairly confident, a level which has slipped to a narrow majority of 51% currently.

Asked how they might vote in the event of a further Referendum of the Northern Ireland Agreement "tomorrow", 66% said they would vote yes in favour, and 20% said they would vote no not in favour (14% did not know). In view of the schism between the Ulster Unionist Party and the DUP, the pre-disposition of UUP voters on this issue is of huge significance. At May 2001, the Poll reveals that UUP supporters continue to endorse David Trimble's stance in supporting the Agreement: 66% said they would vote in favour and 22% said they would vote against (12% did not know).

When these voting tendencies are analysed without the "don't knows", they suggest for the first time since May 1998, a swing in favour of the Agreement, despite a downturn in support which was measured as recently as October 2000. Interestingly, this swing is almost all on the Protestant side, as compared to a very small, but noticeable fall-off in Catholic support from virtually universal levels initially, to 6% suggesting that they might vote against the Agreement currently. In assessing this Protestant swing, there can be no doubt from the poll that Protestants retain grave anxieties with respect to issues such as the lack of decommissioning by the IRA; changes to the identity of the RUC; and the impact of the prisoner release programme. Nevertheless, it appears that these concerns may be being counterbalanced by a generally positive predisposition towards devolution in principle; the continuance of relative (if uneasy) peace; and economic benefits in terms of investment, construction and jobs.

One of the provisions of the Agreement is that the Secretary of State may, no more frequently than every 7 years, hold an appropriate Referendum, if at any time it appears likely to him, that the majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland. Currently, there would appear to be no such case for a Referendum, as 58% would vote to remain part of the UK, compared to 27% who would vote for an all-Ireland Republic (15% did not know): excluding "don't knows" this suggests that the likely outcome of a Referendum would be 68% in favour of remaining part of the UK, and 32% voting for a united Ireland. Protestants could be expected to vote overwhelmingly for remaining part of the UK, but the voting pattern amongst Catholics is less definitive: a majority 59% would vote for a united Ireland, but 19% would vote for remaining part of the United Kingdom. However, over the past 3 years, there is some evidence that this voting propensity has moved slightly but significantly amongst Catholics, in favour of a united Ireland.

The major party participating in the Northern Ireland Executive, and which is neither a signatory to the Agreement, nor in favour of its continuance, is the Democratic Unionist Party. However, the policy of the DUP so far has been to participate in the institutions arising from the Agreement, notably in the Assembly and in the Executive. The electorate as a whole narrowly endorses this approach, and it is of particular significance that 57% of DUP supporters themselves are of the view that the DUP should in fact participate (31% however believe that DUP should abstain).

At the beginning of May 2001, David Trimble issued a post-dated letter of resignation from his position as First Minister, if there has been no IRA decommissioning by the 1st July. Whereas supporters of the nationalist parties overwhelmingly believe that this was an inappropriate action, his action has been endorsed, albeit narrowly, by supporters of his own party, the UUP: 52% thought that he has done the right thing compared to 30% who thought he has done the wrong thing (18% did not know).

Over recent years major confrontations have taken place between the Orange Order, security forces, and (mainly Catholic) residents of the Garvaghy Road. This event has come to crystallize the cultural antipathy between the two sides of the community in Northern Ireland: amongst many Protestants, the Orange parade to the church at Drumcree is regarded as traditional; an expression of religious freedom; and having a history of taking place under peaceful conditions. For many Catholics, Orange parades are seen as sectarian, triumphalist and provocative. At Drumcree, the mainly Catholic residents have established their resistance to the march around the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition, and all poll respondents were invited to state their view as to whether the Orangemen should enter into dialogue with this organisation. These results clearly indicate widespread support amongst both Protestant and Catholic sides of the community that they should do so. 64% of Protestants thought that such dialogue should take place, and 88% of Catholics.

Furthermore, of 3 possible options of the way ahead, there was again rare consensus between Protestants and Catholics: a majority of 61% from either religious background took the view that the preferred outcome at Drumcree would be for some form of parade to go ahead, but only with the agreement of the Garvaghy Road Residents Coalition, following negotiation. (34% of Protestants thought the parade should go ahead without reference to the Coalition, and 38% of Catholics thought the parade should not happen at all.)

It has been suggested, particularly in view of the lack of paramilitary decommissioning since the Agreement was signed, that those parties which signed the Agreement should seek to renegotiate the Agreement, but excluding parties with links to paramilitary organisations. It was found that DUP supporters are most strongly in favour of such a process, but with a more divided view being taken by UUP supporters amongst whom however, those in favour (44%) outnumber those opposed (30%). However, supporters of both SDLP and Sinn Fein are widely opposed to any such renegotiation, and accordingly it is clear that neither of these parties would have any mandate whatsoever from their supporters for attempting to enter into a renegotiation process at this stage. Accordingly, the Poll results demonstrate that any renegotiation could currently only happen amongst Unionist parties: at least one of the nationalist parties would presumably need to be persuaded to enter such renegotiations in order to work towards any form of devolution acceptable to either Westminster or Dublin.

The overall distribution of party support for the forthcoming general election indicates that the Ulster Unionist Party has improved its position since June 1998, largely at the expense of the DUP. On the nationalist side, the SDLP has also marginally improved it position, but in comparison to the previous Opinion Poll of October 2000, it appears to have lost ground considerably to Sinn Fein.

In interpreting these party support findings as compared to election results, 3 considerations apply :

The turnout in Northern Ireland elections can vary greatly depending on the nature of the election, and the circumstances from constituency to constituency. Low turnouts (to which there has been a general trend) tend to concentrate the more committed voters, and thus favour the more 'hard-line' parties. The opinion poll tends to reflect the political affinities of the electorate as a whole, akin to a situation where the turnout in an election was very high.
Not all voters will have access to a candidate of their preferred party : some parties, either because of electoral tactics or lack of resources, will not field candidates in all constituencies. The opinion poll represents the ideal situation where all parties are available to all voters.
The Electoral Office has made it clear that there is an unacceptably high level of voting malpractice in the form of personation and other improprieties, and is investigating ways of improving the situation. The opinion poll is free from such malpractice and to that extent may reflect a truer indicator of party support.

© The report should not be copied or reproduced, in whole or in part, without the permission of Ulster Marketing Surveys and the Belfast Telegraph. Extracts may be cited, where appropriate, with due acknowledgement to Ulster Marketing Surveys and the Belfast Telegraph.